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I. INTRODUCTION
While protecting parents' ability to take leave for pregnancy
and child healthcare remains an important aspect of the Family
and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), another issue has emerged that
received little attention at the time of the law's enactment. The
issue concerns the workers' right to take leave to care for parents
with serious health conditions. The emergence of this issue is tied
to the growing percentage of the American population comprised
of the elderly. The trend of increasing numbers of health-
compromised people over the age of sixty-five will place growing
demands on America's workers to care for aging parents.
This article reports evidence that the aging of the large "baby
boom generation" will place greater demands on employed U.S.
citizens to provide eldercare. The article discusses how eldercare
responsibilities affect the lives of employees and the ability of or-
ganizations to operate effectively and efficiently while accommo-
dating employees needing to take leave. With this background, it
identifies the protections afforded to employees under the FMLA
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by reviewing in detail the relevant case law. The article also dis-
cusses how accommodation of eldercare needs can adversely af-
fect the operation of a business and create exposure to liability for
those employers who fail to meet the FMLA requirements.
II. LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR ELDERCARE
Employment practices in the United States have been signifi-
cantly impacted by legislation in the last fifty years.1 Practices
historically accepted as being within the rights and discretion of
employers became open to legal challenge where they adversely
affected employment opportunities for members of a group pro-
tected by law.
Most notably, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 limited
an employer's discretion when it came to hiring, promoting, dis-
ciplining, or otherwise establishing employment standards where
a person's race, gender, national origin, religion, or color ap-
peared to be a factor that led one person to be treated differently
than people in other groups.2 Subsequently, Congress required
that employers set policies that do not result in the unfair treat-
ment of an employee or job applicant simply because the individ-
ual was forty years old or older3 or because the individual suf-
fered from a physical or mental disability.
4
In 1993, Congress passed the FMLA.5 Its most important pro-
visions granted employees entitled to the FMLA's protections the
right to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in any twelve-month period
if the leave was due to (a) the birth of a child to the employee and
the care of that child;6 (b) the adoption of a child or placement of a
foster child with the employee;7 (c) providing care for the em-
ployee's spouse, son, daughter, or parent if that person had a se-
1. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000)); Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
651-678 (2006)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
3. 29U.S.C. § 631(a) (2006).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
5. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006)).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) (2006).
7. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(B).
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rious health condition;' or (d) the employee having a serious
health condition that renders "the employee unable to perform
the functions" of his or her position.9
Several factors led to the enactment of the FMLA. First, while
the protections offered by the law are gender-neutral, Congress
saw it as a measure designed to continue promoting the interests
of women.1" In the contemporary view of Congress, women remain
primarily responsible for providing family care.1 As a result,
when circumstances arise involving the health of a family mem-
ber requiring an employee to take leave from work, it "affects the
working lives of women more than it affects the working lives of
men."
12
The second motive behind the enactment was Congress's desire
to protect the interests of the family unit that included children.
As stated in the findings of the FMLA, "it is important for the de-
velopment of children and the family unit that fathers and moth-
ers be able to participate in early childrearing and the care of
8. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
9. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). While beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that
Congress amended the Act in 2008 to provide protection for family members required to
take leave to care for a member of the Armed Forces, including members of the National
Guard or Reserves. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(16), 2612(a)(3) (2008). To qualify for protected
leave, the servicemember must have suffered an injury or illness while on active duty so
that he or she may be unfit to perform his or her duties. Id. § 2611(19).
There are several differences that distinguish the leave allowed to care for a service-
member versus other types of protected leave. First, the family member is allowed up to 26
weeks of leave within a twelve-month period. Id. § 2612(a)(3). However, unlike other types
of protected leave, this type of leave is allowed during only one twelve-month period. Com-
pare id. § 2612(a)(1), with id. § 2612(a)(3). The Department of Labor's regulations interp-
ret this to apply on a "per-covered-servicemember, per-injury basis," so that if a covered
employee ultimately has to care for multiple covered servicemembers or the same member
due to a different illness or injury, the employee would be entitled to an additional twenty-
six weeks provided that it did not cause the employee to exceed a total of twenty-six weeks
in a single twelve-month period. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg.
67,934, 68,084-85 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.127(c)(2)). Also, in ad-
dition to allowing the employee who is a spouse, parent, son or daughter of the service-
member to be eligible for protected leave, it also allows protection for the "next of kin" of
the servicemember who is needed to provide care. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(3) (2008). "Next of
kin" is defined as being "the nearest blood relative" of the servicemember. Id. § 2611(18).
The 2008 amendments also added a right to leave for up to 12 weeks for an employee due
to an exigency arising out of a son, daughter or parent being on active duty or having been
notified of an impending call or order to active duty. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(E).
10. See id. § 2601(b)(5) (stating that one of the purposes of the FMLA is "to promote
... equal employment... for women and men").
11. See id. § 2601(a)(5).
12. Id.
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family members who have serious health conditions. ' '"a The law
was important in promoting the interest of employees with fami-
ly-care responsibilities because of the demands on either single
parents or dual-working parents, 14 combined with "the lack of
employment policies to accommodate working parents [that] can
force individuals to choose between job security and parenting." 5
III. THE GRAYING OF AMERICA
Although protecting parents' ability to take leave for pregnancy
or child health care remains an important aspect of the FMLA,
another issue has emerged that received little attention upon
enactment. That issue concerns the workers' right to take leave to
care for parents with serious health conditions. The emergence of
this issue is tied both to advancements in medical science that
enable people with health problems to live longer, and to the
growing percentage of the American population comprised of the
elderly. In 1990, 31.2 million people in the United States were
over the age of sixty-five.'" By 2006, that number had grown to
37.3 million (an increase of 19.5% since 1990), or 12.4% of the to-
tal 2006 population. 7 By 2030, the number of U.S. citizens over
the age of sixty-five is projected to be 71.5 million-an increase of
over 90% from the 2006 level.'" The projection is that persons age
sixty-five and older will comprise roughly 20% of the total popula-
tion, with some states having nearly a quarter of their population
in this group.19
This trend of increasing numbers of health-compromised people
over the age of sixty-five will place greater demands on America's
workers to care for aging parents:
13. Id. § 2601(a)(2).
14. See id. § 2601(a)(1).
15. Id. § 2601(a)(3).
16. ADMIN. ON AGING, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., A STATISTICAL PRO-
FILE OF OLDER AMERICANS AGED 65+ (2008), available at http://www.aoa.gov/AoARoot/
AgingStatistics/Profile/2008/docs/2008profile.pdf (detailing demographics of U.S. elder
population) [herein-after AOA STATISTICAL PROFILE].
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & THE MERCK CO. FOUND., THE
STATE OF AGING AND HEALTH IN AMERICA 2007 III (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
aging/pdf/saha_..2007.pdf; WAN HE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES 119-123 (2005), available at http://www.
census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf.
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"Already, in many companies, we find that workers are more con-
cerned with caring for a parent than a child," says Dan Cahn, Senior
Vice President of Business Development for LTC Financial Part-
ners .... "With 77 million Baby Boomers set to retire, an ever great-
er percentage of workers will be distracted by elder-care needs....
The childcare crisis was solved by day care centers, flextime and
such. Now we need to face the long term healthcare crisis."
20
What is likely to exacerbate the problem is that approximately
30% of those over the age of sixty-five who are not institutiona-
lized live alone.21 For these individuals, there is no spousal assis-
tance when a health crisis arises, and many lack the financial re-
sources that would enable them to hire others to provide
assistance. In 2006, the median income of men and women in this
group was $23,500 and $13,603, respectively. 22 The median in-
come for households containing families headed by a person over
age sixty-five was $39,649.23 In 2005, 37% of the aggregate in-
come for those over sixty-five came from Social Security bene-
fits.
24
The comparatively declining health of this population is re-
flected in a survey reporting that only 39% of non-institution-
alized respondents over the age of sixty-five rated their health as
"excellent or very good," whereas 65% of those aged eighteen to
sixty-four gave the high rating to their own health.25
This article reports on evidence that the aging of the large "ba-
by boom generation" will place greater demands on employed U.S.
citizens to provide eldercare. Eldercare responsibilities will affect
the lives of employees and the ability of organizations to operate
effectively and efficiently while accommodating employees need-
ing to take leave. With this background, this article identifies the
protections afforded to employees under the FMLA and the re-
cently revised regulations of the Department of Labor by review-
ing in detail the relevant case law. This article also discusses how
accommodation of eldercare needs can adversely affect the opera-
20. Press Release, LTC Financial Partners, Long Term Care Could Surpass Childcare
as Challenge for American Business (Oct. 22, 2006), available at http://www.send2press.
com/newswire/2006-10-1022-001.shtml.
21. See AOA STATISTICAL PROFILE, supra note 16, at 1.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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tion of a business and create exposure to liability for those em-
ployers who fail to meet the FMLA requirements.
IV. THE NATURE OF CARE PROVIDED TO THE ELDERLY
Eldercare "requires a set of services to respond to a wide range
of often unpredictable medical, emotional, physical, and financial
possibilities."26 These services can be provided in a house shared
by a caregiver and the elderly, or provided at a separate resi-
dence. Eldercare addresses such diverse needs as meal prepara-
tion, assistance with personal hygiene, giving medicine or medi-
cal care, providing transportation, shopping, housekeeping,
making appointments, managing financial affairs, and offering
companionship.
In 2005, the National Alliance for Caregiving ("NACG") and the
American Association of Retired Persons ("AARP") reported that
nearly one in every four households-about 22.9 million in the
United States-is involved in geriatric caregiving,27 and 73% of
these caregivers are women (mothers, sisters, daughters, and
granddaughters). 2' About 21% of the adult population, or 44.4
million Americans, provide unpaid care to an adult family mem-
ber.29 Statistically, the "typical" caregiver is a forty-six-year-old
woman caring for her seventy-seven-year-old mother who lives
nearby.3"
Instead of utilizing long-term care facilities or in-house care
professionals, family members provide 80% of the direct care for
frail or chronically ill older adults.' Only 5% of U.S. elderly are
institutionalized, with 90% of the disabled elderly not in nursing
26. Karol Rose, Elder Care: A Responsibility that Requires a Collaborative Effort, 15
WORLDATWORK J. Second Quarter 2006, at 60, 62.
27. Janet Aschkenasy, Eldercare Grows up, FINANCIAL PLANNING, Sept. 1, 2005,
available at http://www.financial-planning.com/news/eldercare-grows-up-527132-1.html.
28. ConnectingCaregivers.com, Eldercare and the Sandwich Generation, http://www.
connectingcaregivers.com/content4 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
29. Aschkenasy, supra note 27.
30. Robert E. O'Toole & James Ferry, The Growing Importance of Eldercare Benefits
for an Aging Workforce, COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS J., Winter 2002, at 40.
31. See Age Venture, Assisted Living Offers Cure for Elder Care Limbo, http://www.
demko.com/m990510.htm (last visited May 00, 2009).
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homes but receiving unpaid informal care from relatives and
friends.32
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ELDERCARE PROVIDER
Research on the caregiving effects on the non-professional ca-
regiver suggests that the toll is high. One study found that 16%
quit their jobs, 38% take time off from work for eldercare respon-
sibilities, 30% rearrange their work schedule, and 21% work few-
er hours.33 A 1999 MetLife survey revealed that, "on average, an
eldercare provider suffers a total wealth loss of $659,139 over his
or her lifetime."34 In a study of managers at a national financial
services firm, employees who took family or medical leaves of ab-
sence subsequently had lower salary increases and fewer promo-
tions.35 Furthermore, the MetLife study found that 75% of care-
givers reported that caregiving duties had detrimentally affected
their health.36 The lowest-earning workers face the greatest chal-
lenges as caregivers to the elderly. These employees are under
pressure from the job culture, work demands, and their own fi-
nancial needs that prevent them from considering unpaid leave,
despite having a legal right to it. 37
VI. FACTORS THAT MAY EXACERBATE THE ELDERCARE PROBLEM
The need for eldercare in the United States is growing dramat-
ically because of the large percentage of the population that is
approaching the age of sixty-five, and because of their long life
expectancy, achieved through medical and pharmaceutical ad-
vances.38 Consequently, more elderly citizens live with serious ill-
nesses longer. For example, approximately 27% of people living
with AIDS in the United States are fifty years old or older, and
the proportion of total patients affected in this group is expected
32. Sarah-Vaughan Brakman, Adult Daughter Caregivers, 24 HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 26; see also Rose, supra note 26.
33. Peggie Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work: The Work-Family Issue of the 21st
Century, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 351, 370-71 (2004).
34. Id. at 372.
35. Chardie Baird & John Reynolds, Employee Awareness of Family Leave Benefits:
The Effects of Family, Work, and Gender, 45 SOC. Q. 325, 328 (2004).
36. See Smith, supra note 33, at 372.
37. See Baird & Reynolds, supra note 35, at 328.
38. See Smith, supra note 33, at 355-56.
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to increase. 39 The extended lives of the ill and disabled elderly
will place ever-increasing pressures on their employed loved ones
for assistance.4 °
One source of increasing demand for employee requests for
work leave is to care for elderly family members who suffer from
Alzheimer's disease. Alzheimer's causes varying degrees of de-
mentia with intellectual impairment that is progressive and irre-
versible.41 An estimated 5.2 million Americans age sixty-five and
older had Alzheimer's disease in 2008, and since the incidence of
the disease increases with the age of the population, the number
of people with Alzheimer's is expected to grow proportionally as
the population ages.42 The Alzheimer's Association estimates that
the number of Alzheimer's patients will grow to 7.7 million in
2030, and range from eleven million to sixteen million by 2050.4"
Another factor that contributes to the increasing employee de-
mands for work leave to care for elderly is the decline in Medicare
home health care benefits. 44 Because Medicaid is the primary
source of payments for nursing home care, the decreases in fund-
ing have contributed to the closing of many facilities.45 The avail-
ability of fewer nursing homes leads to increased costs for profes-
sional nursing home care. This, in turn, increases the pressure on
many families to provide personally for the care their loved ones
require.46
In announcing hearings in 2007 on the need for FMLA revi-
sions, the office of Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) issued a press
release reflecting on the growing need for eldercare and its conse-
quences for individual providers:
As 77 million baby boomers approach retirement, more families will
be caring for elderly relatives and more families will need help with
the costs of that care.
39. Christine Gorman, The Graying of AIDS, TIME, Aug. 14, 2006, at 54.
40. See Smith, supra note 33, at 356, 370.
41. See ALZHEIMER'S ASS'N, 2008 ALzHEIMER'S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES 7 (2008)
(on file with author).
42. Id. at 9.
43. Id. at 12.
44. See Gina Reese & Joseph Hafkenschiel, Hot Topics in Home Health Care, 20
WHITTIER L. REV. 365,368 (1998).
45. See Amy Goldstein, States Cut Medicaid Coverage Further, WASH. POST., Dec. 26,
2008, at A01.
46. See Barbara Kantrowitz & Karen Springen, Confronting Alzheimer's, NEWSWEEK,
June 18, 2007, at 54.
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Seventy percent of Americans between the ages of 45 and 55 have at
least one living parent and adult children account for over half of the
most common elder care providers. Many report taking time out of
the workforce, cutting back hours, and losing or turning down oppor-
tunities for trainin and promotion because of their care giving re-
sponsibilities ....
VII. VALUE OF THE FMLA TO EMPLOYERS
When the FMLA was passed in 1993, employers presented lit-
tle opposition." One reason was that corporate America appre-
ciated the need for employees to take leave to serve as caregivers
to their elderly family members. 9 Surprisingly, "[t]he 1995 feder-
al Commission on Leave reported to Congress that," prior to the
passage of the FMLA, "60[%] of firms with fifteen or more em-
ployees already offered workers unpaid sick leave." °
Second, businesses likely supported the FMLA because it pro-
vides businesses with a legal, systematic process for handling
employee requests for eldercare leave, and it places an essentially
uniform burden on other employers. 1 Even though they may be
sympathetic to the requests and may realize some savings in
granting leave, executives understand the harm eldercare leave
requests can cause in the workplace.52 Therefore, executives seek
mechanisms to minimize the cost to their operations while provid-
ing needy employees with as much flexibility as possible.53
VIII. OVERVIEW OF THE FMLA
A. Coverage
Employers covered by the FMLA include "any person engaged
in commerce ... who employs 50 or more employees for each
working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the
47. Senator Klobuchar Calls for Congressional Hearing on Growing Cost of Caring for
Elderly Parents, U.S. FED. NEWS, May 11, 2007 (internal quotation omitted).
48. See Joseph A. Rotondi, Family and Medical Leave Act, REG., Spring 2007, at 4.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 12-14, 16-18, 23-25 (1993), as reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14-18, 18-21, 25-27.
52. See id. at 12-14, 17, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14-16, 19.
53. See Jodie Levin-Epstein, Responsive Workplaces, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 2007, at
A16, A17.
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current or preceding calendar year."5 4 The FMLA also covers pub-
lic agencies.5" This includes all agencies of a state, and all of its
political subdivisions."
Not all employees of a covered employer are entitled to FMLA
benefits. First, the employee must have been employed for at
least twelve months57 and must have 1,250 hours of service dur-
ing the previous twelve months. 51 Second, the FMLA allows em-
ployers to exclude employees from eligibility when the employer
has fewer than fifty workers within seventy-five miles of the site
where the employee is assigned. 9 Finally, the law allows the em-
ployer to exclude "key employees" from being entitled to reins-
tatement to the position held before the leave was taken. 0 For
the "key employee" exemption to apply, the employee must be in
the top 10% of salaried employees within seventy-five miles of the
employee's job location, 1 and the denial must be "necessary to
54. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (2006).
55. See id. § 2611(4)(A)(iii).
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(x) (2006). In Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, the Supreme Court determined that while Congress had violated the 11th Amend-
ment by attempting to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") to the states, it did not overstep its bounds with
making the FMLA applicable to the state as an employer. 538 U.S. 721, 738-40 (2003).
The Court concluded that an exception to the 11th Amendment exists where Congress
makes its intention to regulate the states clear and Congress is acting to assure the provi-
sions of the equal protection clause are being met by the states. See id. at 726, 735.
In Hibbs, both standards were met. First, the language of the statute made clear the in-
tention of Congress to apply the law to the states. Id. at 726. Second, the statute was
clearly aimed at gender-based discrimination that the states had a long history of permit-
ting. Id. at 728-29. Gender discrimination by the states was subject to heightened scruti-
ny, beyond a rational basis test. Id. at 730. In addition, the statute was narrowly focused
on one aspect of employment practices (leave policies) as opposed to the ADEA and ADA,
which affected virtually all aspects of the relationship between the states and their em-
ployees. Id. at 739-40. The FMLA was both appropriate and proportional to the legitimate
ends of Congress.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i) (2006).
58. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(ii). The newly revised Department of Labor regulations have clari-
fied cases where an employee has satisfied the 1,250 hour requirement and was granted a
leave, but had not yet been employed twelve months. Leave prior to the twelve-month an-
niversary is not leave protected by the FMLA; however, if the leave continues after that
point, it is protected, assuming it was for a reason that qualifies under the FMLA. Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,078 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d)).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
60. See id. § 2614(5)(b)(1).
61. Id. § 2614(b)(2).
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prevent substantial and grievous economic injury to the opera-
tions of the employer."62
B. Employee Eligibility for Leave to Care for a Parent
For an employee to be entitled to leave under the FMLA be-
cause of circumstances relating to the health of a parent, the law
requires both that the parent has a serious health condition and
that the employee is needed to care for the parent." The FMLA
defines a "serious health condition" as "an illness, injury, im-
pairment, or physical or mental condition that involves: (A) inpa-
tient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facili-
ty; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider."'
Department of Labor regulations state that "[i]npatient care
means an overnight stay in a hospital, hospice, or residential
medical care facility, including any period of incapacity as defined
in § 825.113(b), or any subsequent treatment in connection with
such inpatient care."65
The Department's regulations are much more detailed and
complicated when dealing with establishing a serious health con-
dition through evidence of "continuing treatment by a health care
provider."66 In summary, this can be accomplished by demonstrat-
62. Id. § 2614(b)(1)(A).
63. See id. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
64. Id. § 2611(11).
65. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,079 (Nov. 18, 2008)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.114). The regulation defines incapacity as the "inability
to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health
condition, treatment therefore, or recovery therefrom." Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §
825.113(b)).
66. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.115). The regulation provides:
A serious health condition involving continuing treatment by a health care
provider includes any one or more of the following:
(a) Incapacity and treatment. A period of incapacity of more than three
consecutive, full calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or pe-
riod of incapacity relating to the same condition, that also involves:
(1) Treatment two or more times, within 30 days of the first day
of incapacity, unless extenuating circumstances exist, by a
health care provider, by a nurse under direct supervision of a
health care provider, or by a provider of health care services
(e.g., physical therapist) under orders of, or on referral by, a
health care provider; or
(2) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion,
which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the
supervision of the health care provider.
2009] 1329
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(3) The requirement in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section
for treatment by a health care provider means an in-person visit
to a health care provider. The first (or only) in-person treatment
visit must take place within seven days of the first day of inca-
pacity.
(4) Whether additional treatment visits or a regimen of continu-
ing treatment is necessary within the 30-day period shall be de-
termined by the health care provider.
(5) The term extenuating "extenuating circumstances" in para-
graph (a)(1) of this section means circumstances beyond the em-
ployee's control that prevent the follow-up visit from occurring
as planned by the health care provider. Whether a given set of
circumstances are extenuating depends on the facts. For exam-
ple, extenuating circumstances exist if a health care provider de-
termines that a second in-person visit is needed within the 30-
day period, but the health care provider does not have any
available appointments during that time period.
(b) Pregnancy or prenatal care. Any period of incapacity due to preg-
nancy, or for prenatal care. (citation omitted)
(c) Chronic conditions. Any period of incapacity or treatment for such
incapacity due to a chronic serious health condition. A chronic serious
health condition is one which:
(1) Requires periodic visits (defined as at least twice a year) for
treatment by a health care provider, or by a nurse under direct
supervision of a health care provider;
(2) Continues over an extended period of time (including recur-
ring episodes of a single underlying condition); and
(3) May cause episodic rather than a continuing period of inca-
pacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.).
(d) Permanent or long-term conditions. A period of incapacity which is
permanent or long-term due to a condition for which treatment may
not be effective. The employee or family member must be under the
continuing supervision of, but need not be receiving active treatment
by, a health care provider. Examples include Alzheimer's, a severe
stroke, or the terminal stages of a disease.
(e) Conditions requiring multiple treatments. Any period of absence to
receive multiple treatments (including any period of recovery there-
from) by a health care provider or by a provider of health care services
under orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider for:
(1) Restorative surgery after an accident or other injury; or
(2) A condition that would likely result in a period of incapacity
of more than three consecutive, full calendar days in the absence
of medical intervention or treatment, such as cancer (chemothe-
rapy, radiation, etc.), severe arthritis (physical therapy), or kid-
ney disease (dialysis).
(f) Absences attributable to incapacity under paragraph (b) or (c) of this
section qualify for FMLA leave even though the employee or the cov-
ered family member does not receive treatment from a health care pro-
vider during the absence, and even if the absence does not last more
than three consecutive, full calendar days. For example, an employee
with asthma may be unable to report for work due to the onset of an
asthma attack or because the employee's health care provider has ad-
vised the employee to stay home when the pollen count exceeds a cer-
tain level. An employee who is pregnant may be unable to report to
work because of severe morning sickness.
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ing: (1) "A period of incapacity of more than three consecutive,
full calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or period of in-
capacity relating to the same condition.... "67 Unless there are
extenuating circumstances, this requires either that the person
have follow-up treatments at least twice within thirty days of the
first incapacity, 8 or treatment at least once by a health care pro-
vider which "results in a regimen of continuing supervision by the
provider";69 (2) "[IIncapacity due to pregnancy or for prenatal
care";7 ° (3) Any period of incapacity or treatment related to a
chronic condition which may be episodic in nature. Whether it
qualifies is determined by whether the condition exists over an
extended period of time and requires periodic visits to a health
care provider for treatment;7 (4) Any period of incapacity that is
permanent or long-term for which treatment may not be effec-
tive;72 or, (5) "Any period of absence to receive multiple treat-
ments" either for restorative surgery following an accident or oth-
er injury, or for a condition that is likely to lead to incapacity for
three or more consecutive calendar days unless there is medical
intervention.73
Cosmetic treatments such as plastic surgery are ordinarily ex-
cluded from coverage, unless inpatient care is needed, complica-
tions develop, the treatment occurs after an injury, or the treat-
ment involves the removal of a cancerous growth.74 Unless there
are complications, "the common cold, the flu, ear aches, upset
stomach, minor ulcers, headaches other than migraine, routine
dental or orthodontia problems, [and] periodontal disease" are ex-
Id. at 68,079-80 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.115).
67. Id. at 68,079 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a)).
68. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a)(1)).
69. See id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a)(2)). Measures, such as an order to
take over-the-counter medicine, that can be initiated without a visit to a health care pro-
vider are not sufficient to qualify as a regimen of continuing treatment. Id. (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)).
70. Id. at 68,079-80 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(b)).
71. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(c)). Examples of episodic condition in-
clude conditions relating to such things as asthma, diabetes and epilepsy. Id. (to be codi-
fied at 29 C.F.R. § 825.115 (c)(3)).
72. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(d)).
73. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(e)).
74. Id. at 68,079 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(d)).
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cluded as well.75 Mental illness or allergies can qualify if the af-
fliction meets the definition of being a serious health condition.76
If a person has several diagnoses that individually do not rise
to the level of a serious health condition, he or she may still quali-
fy if the diagnoses cumulatively constitute a serious health condi-
tion. In Price v. City of Fort Wayne, the Seventh Circuit dealt
with that very issue.77 In that case, the plaintiff, Ms. Price, re-
ceived an ultrasound scan and a later scan of her thyroid, an ex-
cision of a benign infected cyst, a needle biopsy on her thyroid,
and a CT scan on her brain, brain stem, and sinuses within ap-
proximately one month. Her physician stated in an affidavit
that when Price came to his office, she was in "an alarming condi-
tion" and "was on the edge of a break-down, both physically and
mentally."79 The physician's statement indicated that Ms. Price
could not work and that continuing to work "would be seriously
detrimental to her health." °
In reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment for
the defendant on the plaintiffs FMLA claim, the court pointed
out that the statute was passed to help people ensure balance be-
tween their working and personal lives.8" "Whether these medical
reasons take the form of one discrete illness, such as cancer, or
the form of several different and seemingly unrelated illnesses all
afflicting a single individual at the same time, such as in Price's
case, is of no moment to the purposes of the FMLA."82 The court
suggested that a person's ability to work could be impaired by
multiple illnesses.8 3 This was deemed true, even if the set of ill-
nesses were not individually recognized as serious health condi-
tions, and did not impair the worker's ability in the same way as
a single serious health condition. 4
Beyond establishing that a serious health condition exists for
the parent, the employee must also show that he or she is needed
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 117 F.3d 1022, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997).
78. Id. at 1024.
79. Id. at 1025.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1024.
82. Id. at 1024-25.
83. Id. at 1025.
84. See id. at 1025.
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to care for the parent's serious health condition. 5 Care goes
beyond providing physical assistance; Department of Labor regu-
lations provide that leave "may also be taken to provide care or
psychological comfort to a covered family member with a serious
health condition." 6 In Brunelle v. Cytec Plastics, Inc., the district
court adopted the magistrate judge's finding that the employee's
bedside assistance in medical decision making for his critically
burned father qualified for FMLA leave. 7 The facts in Brunelle
demonstrated that, during the father's hospitalization for a num-
ber of months, the plaintiff was constantly present to make deci-
sions regarding his father's care.88 On the day in question, the
plaintiff "undertook a daylong vigil" and assisted the doctors with
medical decision making. 9
Brunelle contrasts with Fioto v. Manhattan Woods Golf Enter-
prises, where the plaintiff was fired after missing work on the day
of his mother's emergency brain surgery.9 ° The jury in Fioto re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff on the FMLA claim. 1 The court,
which had reserved judgment on the defendant's motion to dis-
miss, granted the dismissal, overturning the jury verdict.92 The
court concluded that, although Fioto was at the hospital that day,
the record lacked evidence that Fioto interacted with either his
mother or her physicians.93 The only evidence presented was that
Fioto's mother had brain surgery, that her doctors told Fioto it
was serious and she might not survive, and that Fioto did not see
his mother after the surgery.94 The court found that being at a
parent's bedside to offer comfort and reassurance qualifies as
"caring for" the parent.9 5 The court assumed that helping to make
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006).
86. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,087 (Nov. 17, 2008)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(b)).
87. See 225 F. Supp. 2d 67, 69, 71 (D. Me. 2002).
88. Id. at 71.
89. Id. at 77.
90. See 270 F. Supp. 2d 401, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
91. Id. at 402.
92. See id. at 403. The jury had also found in the plaintiff's favor on a breach of con-
tract claim the plaintiff had filed. Id. at 402. The claim was predicated on an agreement
that provided plaintiff could only be terminated for "reasonable cause." See id. at 407. The
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law was denied by the court, and the jury's
verdict was allowed to stand. Id. at 406-07.
93. See id. at 404.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 405.
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medical decisions would also qualify.96 In this case, Fioto had of-
fered no evidence that he provided physical or psychological
care.97 The court concluded that merely visiting a sick parent
with a serious health condition did not qualify as providing care."
For the plaintiff to prevail on a FMLA claim, he must show that
he participated in some form of on-going care. 99
Regarding an employee's entitlement to FMLA leave for be-
reavement after the death of a parent, courts have read the pro-
tections of the statute literally. In Brown v. J.C. Penney Corp.,
the plaintiff took FMLA leave to care for his terminally ill fa-
ther.' 0 When his father died almost two months later, the em-
ployee did not notify his employer and waited almost another
month before reporting to work. 1' When he did report, he was
told that he had been reassigned to a different position at the
same pay rate.' 2 The plaintiffs refusal to accept the reassign-
ment resulted in his termination.' 3 The Brown court concluded
that the statutory language and legislative history allowing leave
for a serious health condition was limited to health conditions
that affect living persons.'0 4 The plaintiff provided no authority
for the argument that a parent's "serious health condition" con-
tinued after the parent was dead.' 5 "Put simply, if Congress
wanted to ensure that employees on FMLA leave could take addi-
tional time off after a family member died from a serious health
condition, it easily could have said so in the statute.'
0 6
In Lange v. Showbiz Pizza Time, Inc., the court dealt with a
similar issue."' The plaintiff in Lange took FMLA leave to care
for his mother, who was suffering from pancreatic cancer.'0 8 Al-
though his mother died one week after his leave began, Lange did
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 404.
99. Id.
100. 924 F. Supp. 1158, 1159 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1162.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See 12 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152-53 (D. Kan. 1998).
108. Id. at 1152.
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not immediately return to work.' °9 One week after his mother's
death, the employer notified Lange that he needed to return to
work or he would be terminated.10 Despite his request for addi-
tional time to console relatives, personally grieve, and deal with
funeral arrangements, Lange was terminated when he failed to
return to work.' Following the rationale of Brown, the court
found that the FMLA is intended to provide protected leave to
care for the living who suffered from a serious health condition." 2
One difference between Lange and Brown is that Lange also
argued that he should be entitled to leave under the FMLA be-
cause of the "grief and despair" that he suffered due to his moth-
er's death."1 3 In other words, Lange contended that his condition
following her death created a "serious health condition" of his
own." 4 Although the court acknowledged the possibility that this
was a plausible argument, it found that Lange had failed to allege
any facts supporting that claim.115
C. Protections Afforded by the FMLA
In the event that an eligible worker qualifies to take leave to
care for a parent, the FMLA provides a number of rights for the
employee, including the right to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in
any twelve-month period." 6 At the conclusion of the leave, the
employee is entitled to be restored either to the position held
prior to the leave"' or to an equivalent position with equivalent
pay and benefits." 8
The right to reinstatement is dependent on a variety of factors.
First, the employee must be able to return to work after twelve
109. See id. at 1152-53.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1153.
112. Id. at 1154.
113. Id,
114. See id.
115. See id. The court did grant the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to add fac-
tual statements that would support this claim. Id.
116. 29 U.S.C § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006). As discussed earlier, the time expands to 26
weeks for the employee if the family member is a servicemember who suffered an injury or
illness in the line of duty. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934,
68,084-85 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.127(c)(2)).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A) (2006).
118. See id. § 2614(a)(1)(B).
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weeks of FMLA leave." 9 In Talkin v. Deluxe Corp., the employee
used his twelve weeks of FMLA leave by early September 2004.120
However, he was not able to return to work until November 1,
2004.121 Talkin alleged that he was entitled to additional time off
between those dates because he had been approved for leave
beyond twelve weeks, a point that was disputed by the employ-
er.'22 The court concluded that the issue of additional approved
leave was immaterial to the FMLA claim because he did not re-
turn to work within the twelve-week period protected by the sta-
tute.123 Even if the employer had agreed to allow him additional
time off, it was not protected leave. 2 4 When he sought to return
to work in November, he was not returning from FMLA leave,
and, thus, had no entitlement to return to his former position. 125
Second, the court found that the plaintiff had not provided
medical certification that he was able to return to work at the
time his FMLA leave concluded.'26 At the time, the Department of
Labor regulations provided that when the employee sought reins-
tatement, the employer had the right to request medical certifica-
tion of the employee's ability to return to work.127 Talkin had
119. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. at 68,086 (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(a)).
120. No. 05-2305-CM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36975, at *4 (D. Kan. May 18, 2007).
121. Id.
122. See id. at *13 n.5.
123. See id. at *13-14 (citing Farina v. Compuware Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1054
(D. Ariz. 2003); Hanson v. Sports Auth., 256 F. Supp. 2d 927, 936 (W.D. Wis. 2003); Sum-
mers v. Middleton & Reutinger, 214 F. Supp. 2d 751, 757-58 (W.D. Ky. 2002)).
124. See id. at *15.
125. See id. at *15-16 (internal citations omitted).
126. See id. at *13-14 (citing Mondaine v. Am. Drug Stores, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 1169,
1205-06 (D. Kan. 2006)).
127. See id. Section 825.311(c) of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations provided:
When requested by the employer pursuant to a uniformly applied policy for
similarly-situated employees, the employee must provide medical certifica-
tion at the time the employee seeks reinstatement at the end of FMLA leave
taken for the employee's serious health condition, that the employee is fit for
duty and able to return to work ....
29 C.F.R. § 825.311(c) (1995).
The new regulations provide more detail as to the requirement of certification and allow
the employer to contact the employee's health care provider. 29 C.F.R. § 825.312 now pro-
vides in part:
(a) As a condition of restoring an employee whose FMLA leave was occa-
sioned by the employee's own serious health condition that made the em-
ployee unable to perform the employee's job, an employer may have a un-
iformly-applied policy or practice that requires all similarly-situated
employees (i.e., same occupation, same serious health condition) who take
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failed to provide this certification when his FMLA leave ex-
pired.1
2
Finally, the court concluded that Talkin was not entitled to re-
turn to his former position because he had failed to show that he
was able to perform that job when his FMLA leave expired in
September.129 The court cited Department of Labor regulations
stating that if the employee is unable to perform an essential
function of the position because of a physical or mental condition,
the employee has no right under the FMLA to be restored to his
leave for such conditions to obtain and present certification from the em-
ployee's health care provider that the employee is able to resume work. The
employee has the same obligations to participate and cooperate (including
providing a complete and sufficient certification or providing sufficient autho-
rization to the health care provider to provide the information directly to the
employer) in the fitness-for-duty certification as in the initial certification
process. (citation omitted).
(b) An employer may seek a fitness-for-duty certification only with regard to
the particular health condition that caused the employee's need for FMLA
leave. The certification from the employee's health care provider must certify
that the employee is able to resume work. Additionally, an employer may re-
quire that the certification specifically address the employee's ability to per-
form the essential functions of the employee's job. In order to require such a
certification, an employer must provide an employee with a list of the essen-
tial functions of the employee's job no later than with the designation notice
required by § 825.300(d), and must indicate in the designation notice that the
certification must address the employee's ability to perform those essential
functions. If the employer satisfies these requirements, the health care pro-
vider must certify that the employee can perform the identified essential
functions of his or her job. Following the procedures set forth in § 825.307(a),
the employer may contact the health care provider for purposes of clarifying
and authenticating the fitness-for-duty certification. Clarification may be re-
quested only for the serious health condition for which FMLA leave was tak-
en ....
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,105 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be
codified at 27 C.F.R § 825.312(a)-(b)).
128. Talkin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36975, at *14.
129. Id. at *15-16.
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position.8 ° The court concluded that this meant Talkin was also
not entitled to placement in an equivalent position.131
In Tardie v. Rehabilitation Hospital of Rhode Island, the court
reached a result similar to the result in Talkin.'32 Tardie was the
hospital's Director of Human Resources and worked between fifty
and seventy hours a week before she developed a variety of symp-
toms, including chest pains, numbness in her arms and dizziness,
that forced her to take FMLA leave for multiple weeks.'33 When
she sought to return to her position, she informed her employer
that she would start back part-time and would gradually work up
to forty hours a week but that she could no longer work beyond
that.' Her doctor later advised her that her symptoms were re-
lated to job-created stress and that although she could return to
work on a full-time basis, she should avoid stress and should not
work sixty to seventy hours a week.'35
The employer determined that the director position required
more of a time commitment than the plaintiff could provide and
told her that she would not be able to return to that position.'36
While she initially agreed to accept a severance package, she lat-
er filed a charge of discrimination based on disability with the
Rhode Island Human Rights Commission.'37 Her lawsuit included
a count alleging a violation of the FMLA because of the employ-
er's refusal to reinstate her. 38
130. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) (1995)).
The new regulations now provide:
§ 825.216 Limitations on an employee's right to reinstatement.
(c) If the employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position
because of a physical or mental condition, including the continuation of a se-
rious health condition or an injury or illness also covered by workers' com-
pensation, the employee has no right to restoration to another position under
the FMLA. The employer's obligations may, however, be governed by the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as amended (citations omitted).
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,094 (Nov. 17, 2008)
(to be codified at 27 C.F.R § 825.216(c).
131. See Talkin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36975, at *15-16.
132. See 6 F. Supp. 2d 125, 132 (D.R.I. 1998).
133. Id. at 127-28.
134. Id. at 128.
135. Id. at 128-29.
136. Id. at 128.
137. Id. at 129.
138. Id. at 127.
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The Tardie court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the FMLA claim.'39 The court found that the respon-
sibilities of the director position required the director to be at
work at various times during the workweek to interact with em-
ployees working the three shifts of the hospital.14 ° Working ex-
tended hours was essential, and the court concluded that the
plaintiff could not meet the position's obligations by working only
forty hours a week and, thus, had no right to reinstatement. 4
1
The employee's right to reinstatement may also be affected by
structural changes or layoff decisions that occur during his or her
FMLA leave. So long as an employer is not taking retaliatory ac-
tion against the employee for taking leave, legitimate restructur-
ing of an organization or layoffs by an employer that lead to ter-
mination of a worker on FMLA leave are permissible.
1 4 1
In Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., the employer decided
to eliminate two positions at a casino it managed for an Indian
tribe. 43 The plaintiff, who was on FMLA leave at the time, pre-
139. Id. at 132.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. The relevant regulations provide:
An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and
conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously em-
ployed during the FMLA leave period. An employer must be able to show that
an employee would not otherwise have been employed at the time reinstate-
ment is requested in order to deny restoration to employment. For example:
(1) If an employee is laid off during the course of taking FMLA leave
and employment is terminated, the employer's responsibility to contin-
ue FMLA leave, maintain group health plan benefits and restore the
employee cease at the time the employee is laid off, provided the em-
ployer has not continuing obligations under a collective bargaining
agreement or otherwise. An employer would have the burden of prov-
ing that an employee would have been laid off during the FMLA leave
period and, therefore, would not be entitled to restoration. Restoration
to a job slated for lay-off when the employee's original position is not
would not meet the requirements of an equivalent position.
(2) If a shift has been eliminated, or overtime has been decreased, an
employee would not be entitled to return to work that shift or the orig-
inal overtime hours upon restoration. However, if a position on, for ex-
ample, a night shift has been filled by another employee, the employee
is entitled to return to the same shift on which employed before taking
FMLA leave.
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,094 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R § 825.216(a)(1)-(2)).
143. 352 F. Supp. 2d 653, 655-56 (W.D.N.C. 2005).
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viously held one of the two eliminated positions. 144 Although the
plaintiff was invited to apply for a new position, he failed to do
so. 145 When he attempted to return from leave, he was termi-
nated, which led him to sue his employer on the claim that the
employer's conduct constituted both interference with his FMLA
rights and retaliation against him for taking leave.
14
The Yashenko court found that the right to reinstatement to
the pre-FMLA leave position at the conclusion of leave is not ab-
solute.147 The court cited to the statute, which provides that the
employer is not required to grant an employee on FMLA leave
"'any right, benefit, or position of employment other than the
right, benefit, or position to which the employee would have been
entitled to had [he] never taken leave." 14' The Department of La-
bor regulations make it clear that the employee on leave has no
greater right to reinstatement than he would have had with con-
tinuous employment. 14
9
A result similar to Yashenko was reached in Bearley v. Friendly
Ice Cream Corp. ° Prior to the plaintiff taking FMLA leave, the
company began discussing changes in its bookkeeping operations
that would lead to a reduction in employee work hours, including
the plaintiffs hours."' When the plaintiff attempted to return to
work, she was told that her responsibilities would change.' 52 Un-
der the new organization, she would no longer perform forty
hours of bookkeeping duties.'53 Instead, the hours for those re-
sponsibilities would be nearly cut in half, and the remainder of
her weekly hours would include food preparation and serving at
one of the company's restaurants.'54
Similar to Yashenko, the Bearley court found that the FMLA
gave the employer the right to take action that would adversely
affect an employee's restoration rights if the same action would
144. Id. at 656.
145. Id.
146. Id,
147. Id. at 657.
148. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B) (2000)).
149. See id. at 657-58.
150. See 322 F. Supp. 2d 563, 571 (M.D. Pa. 2004).
151. Id. at 568.
152. See id. at 569.
153. See id.
154. Id.
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have been taken without request for or actual taking of FMLA
leave.155 In Bearley, the record showed that even before Bearley
took her leave, the company considered reducing bookkeeper re-
sponsibilities while expanding the role of the restaurant's general
managers to include bookkeeping duties.156 The evidence demon-
strated that the plaintiffs bookkeeping hours would have been
reduced regardless of her FMLA leave.'57
As to the issue of restoring the person returning from FMLA
leave to an equivalent position, the statute provides that an
equivalent position is one with "equivalent employment benefits,
pay, and other terms and conditions of employment." 5 ' According
to Department of Labor regulations "[a]n equivalent position is
one that is virtually identical to the employee's former position in
terms of pay, benefits and working conditions, including privileg-
es, perquisites and status. It must involve the same or substan-
tially similar duties and responsibilities which must entail sub-
stantially equivalent skill, effort, responsibility, and authority." 59
Simply providing an employee equivalent pay and benefits is
not enough. Courts look at several factors, including the level of
training and education required for the new position versus that
of the former one. 16 For example, consider Nocella v. Basement
Experts of America, where an employee returning from leave had
been an office manager with oversight responsibilities for other
employees.' 6 ' Upon her return, she was assigned to a position
where she answered to a different superior and was only respon-
sible for reviewing the company's 1-9 forms for federal com-
pliance.162 The Nocella court rejected the employer's argument
that this assignment was equivalent because both positions were
155. Id. at 571-72.
156. See id. at 572.
157. Id.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(B) (2006).
159. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,093 (Nov. 17, 2008)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 825.215(a)).
160. See, e.g., Donahoo v. Master Data Center, 282 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552 (E.D. Mich.
2003). In Donahoo, the court found that assigning an employee who was working as a
computer analyst before FMLA leave to a data-entry position was not equivalent, even
though the employee was paid the same and had the same benefits as prior to leave. Id.
161. 499 F. Supp. 2d 935, 938 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
162. Id.
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administrative/clerical and the employee enjoyed the same pay
and benefits.
163
The law does not require that the employer provide for paid
leave.6 4 Further, if the employer allows paid leave for less than
twelve weeks, the employer is allowed to use the period of paid
leave in computing when twelve weeks of FMLA leave expires. 65
In addition, the employer may require, or the employee may elect,
that the employee take accrued paid vacation time or personal-
leave as part of the twelve-week leave. 66 For an employee to be
able to substitute accrued paid leave, the request must be consis-
tent with the employer's normal leave policy. 67 In other words, if
the employer has blackout periods where paid leave is not permit-
ted, the employee can take FMLA leave for a qualifying event but
cannot expect to be compensated.
The employee is also entitled to protection of benefits accrued
prior to taking FMLA leave. 8' While this protects the employee's
seniority and benefits earned prior to the leave, it does not entitle
the employee to accrue additional seniority or benefits while on
leave. 69 However, the employee cannot be denied any right, bene-
fit, or position that he would have been entitled to if he or she had
not taken the leave. 70 Thus, if a benefit plan is changed while the
employee is on protected leave, the employee is entitled to partic-
ipate in the change upon the employee's return unless the benefit
is tied to seniority or accrual.' 7 '
Another important attribute of the FMLA is that if the employ-
er offers a group health insurance plan to its employees, an em-
ployee covered by the health plan who takes approved leave is en-
163. Id. at 941-42. The Nocella court concluded that, in effect, the change in positions
meant that "[sihe was moved from the middle of a chain of command to the bottom of
another." Id. at 942.
164. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (2006).
165. Id. § 2612(d)(1).
166. Id. § 2612(d)(2)(B).
167. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 67,979 (Nov. 17, 2008)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 825.207(a)).
168. 29 U.S.C § 2614(a)(2).
169. Id. § 2614(a)(3)(A).
170. Id. § 2614(a)(3)(B).
171. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,093 (Nov. 17, 2008)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 825.215(d)(5)). For example, if the change in a benefit plan is
tied to hours worked and the employee does not have the required hours because of FMLA
leave, he or she is not entitled to the benefit. Id.
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titled to remain covered during the leave.172 The law provides that
if the employee has been paying a portion of the premium cost,
the employer can continue to require the employee to pay that
portion during the leave.
17 3
IX. LEAVES OF ABSENCE-A VEXING PROBLEM FOR EMPLOYERS
A. The Impact of Leaves of Absence on Employers
In creating a law designed to provide legal protection to a
worker taking a leave of absence, Congress tried to strike a bal-
ance between the interests of the worker and the family on one
side, and the employer on the other.
Without the law's protection, an employee facing either his or
her own serious health condition or that of a family member may
be forced to take a leave that results in loss of employment, caus-
ing him to lose his job and the health care benefits that come with
it. For that individual, and the other family members who are
covered by the employee's health plan, a major crisis that gene-
rates high, uncovered hospital and medical expenses might be an
event from which they can never financially recover.
From a social standpoint, the potential for financial ruin justi-
fies the existence of a law that provides protected leave for se-
rious health conditions. However, the employer's needs must be
considered as well. Eldercare has been called the "'silent produc-
tivity killer."'"74 A 2006 study by the MetLife Mature Market In-
stitute found that American companies lose a total of $33.6 billion
per year because of demands on employees who must care for an
aging parent or other incapacitated loved one. 75 In an earlier
172. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1) (2006).
173. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. at 68,091 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R § 825.210(a)). The regulations further provide that if the premiums are raised or
lowered, the employee's payment should be adjusted during the leave accordingly. Id. In
addition, if the employee is more than 30 days late in making the payments, the employer
has the right to terminate coverage so long as it has mailed notice of the termination to
the employee 15 days before coverage is to cease. Id. at 68,091-92 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 825.212(a)(1)).
174. Society for Human Resource Management, Elder Care by Employees is "Silent
Productivity Killer", Dec. 9, 2003, available at http://seniorjournal.com/NEWS/Eldercare/3-
12-09workers.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
175. See LTC Financial Partners, supra note 20; see also Robert E. O'Toole, Integrating
Contributory Elder-Care Benefits with Voluntary Long-Term Care Insurance Programs, 27
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J. 13, 13-17 (2002).
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study, MetLife found that eldercare costs employers $1,141 per
employee per year in absenteeism, turnover, and lost productivi-
ty. 176 A factor that adds significantly to these costs is that approx-
imately 20% of the FMLA leave is for periods of one day or less,
which adds considerable administrative costs relative to the du-
ration of employee leave.
177
The costs of caregiving that are borne by the employer fall into
five major categories: (1) replacement costs for employees who
leave due to care-giving responsibilities; (2) absenteeism costs; (3)
costs due to partial absenteeism; (4) costs due to workday inter-
ruptions; and (5) workers retiring sooner than they planned.'78
Replacing employees who change jobs because of eldercare issues
is particularly costly for a company. The results of one study show
that it costs 150% of a salaried worker's pay for a company to
find, hire, and train a new person.'79 For hourly workers, turno-
ver costs amount to 50% to 75% of annual pay.180
Furthermore, flexibility in work schedules and the availability
of leave are associated with lower employee turnover, with 73% of
employees with high flexibility jobs-versus 54% of those with
low flexibility jobs-remaining at their jobs the following year.18 '
B. The FMLA and the Uncertainty Created for Employers
The success of a business may be tied to the employer's ability
to make predictions and minimize the risks that come with uncer-
tainty. The FMLA's provisions on leaves of absence added a level
of uncertainty to the employer's ability to forecast how leaves will
affect operations.' 2 A business may recognize the options availa-
ble to it to when it comes to having the absent employee's work
assigned to another employee. However, the rights provided to
workers under the FMLA frequently make it difficult for the em-
ployer to know which alternative would best serve its interests
176. See Rose, supra note 26, at 62.
177. See Rotondi, supra note 48, at 5.
178. See O'Toole & Ferry, supra note 30, at 41 (listing a sixth cost that is not one com-
monly borne by employers: costs associated with supervising employed caregivers).
179. See Levin-Epstein, supra note 53, at A17.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. See infra Part lV.C.
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and, regardless of the option chosen, whether the employee's ab-
sence will ultimately harm the company.11
3
In part, this uncertainty results from the fact that the length of
time that a worker needs to be absent may be unpredictable.
Health conditions vary. Sometimes a patient recovers more quick-
ly than expected. Sometimes recovery is hampered by complica-
tions. A parent may have a serious health condition that the
treating physician believes will ultimately claim his or her life,
but the survival period is often uncertain. Perhaps the illness is
debilitating but not life threatening. Maybe the parent will pe-
riodically need treatment at a health care facility and is depen-
dent on the employed adult child for transportation. The elder-
care need is highly variable; it can persist for months or even
years.
The unpredictability of the leave makes it difficult for employ-
ers to plan. In some cases, the employer may be able to accommo-
date the leave with schedule adjustments or by providing over-
time for other employees. In other instances, the employer may
find it necessary to implement a more costly and complicated so-
lution that raises a number of issues. Should the employer hire a
temporary replacement? If the employer needs a highly skilled
worker, is such an employee even available? Should the employer
reassign the work done by the employee to others? What effect
will the reassignment have on other workers' ability to do their
jobs?
The FMLA standards help bring clarity to employers-at least
on some issues. The statute and regulations provide both a defini-
tion for what qualifies as a serious health condition" 4 and a me-
chanism for resolving disputes between the employer and the
employee over whether the particular health condition meets that
definition.8 5 The FMLA also established a requirement that,
where the leave is foreseeable, the employee must provide thirty
days' notice of his or her need for leave or, if that is not possible,
the employee must provide notice as soon as practicable.8 6
183. See infra Part X.B.
184. See 29 U.S.C § 2611(11) (2006).
185. See id. § 2613.
186. See id. § 2612(e)(2)(B).
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However, the FMLA also created the potential that the differ-
ent types of leave allowed by the law could create disruptions that
employers may not have envisioned when the law was enacted.
Essentially, there are three types of leave that the Act permits:
(1) leave for a single block of time; (2) intermittent leave; and (3)
leave on a reduced-schedule basis.8 7
Where the employee needs a single block of time to attend to
the needs of a parent, there is likely to be a higher level of predic-
tability as to the length and timing of the leave. For example, the
parent facing surgery may have a period that follows where sig-
nificant time is needed from the employee to provide care. How-
ever, the health care provider has an ability to predict that the
employee is likely to be needed for a specific period before the
parent will be able to care for him or herself. The employer then
may have a reasonable idea of the time that other employees or a
temporary replacement will likely be needed to take over work for
the absent employee.
Instead of a single block of time, the employee may need inter-
mittent leave or leave on a reduced-schedule basis."88 Intermit-
tent leave is "taken in separate blocks of time due to a single qua-
lifying reason.""8 9 This would include cases where a parent needs
follow-up treatment that requires the time of the employee, or
where the treatment has debilitating side effects that prevent the
patient from temporarily caring for him or herself. It could also
include a chronic condition that periodically and unpredictably
flares up, rendering the parent in need of the care of the em-
ployee and causing the employee to miss work unexpectedly. It
can be taken in periods as short as one hour or as long as several
weeks.19o
Leave that is taken on a reduced-schedule basis involves
changing the work schedule of the employee, meaning reducing
the hours of the employee's workweek which could cause the em-
ployee to be reduced from full-time to part-time status.' 9' For ex-
ample, it could cover cases where the employee must leave work
187. See id. § 2612(a)-(b).
188. See id. § 2612(b)(1).
189. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,087 (Nov. 17, 2008)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 825.202).
190. Id. at 68,087 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(b)(1)).
191. Id. at 68,087 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(a)).
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to administer a treatment to his or her parent during the work-
day. It could also cover the instance where one day every week,
the parent needs to receive treatment outside the home (e.g., di-
alysis) and the parent is dependent on the son or daughter for
transportation.
C. Intermittent and Reduced-Schedule Leaves
So long as the intermittent leave or leave on a reduced-
schedule basis does not exceed twelve total weeks in a twelve-
month period, the statute imposes no limit on the number of
times an employee can take these types of leave.192 For example,
an employee who can establish a qualifying need for leave could
conceivably request one day of leave every week of the year, or
one hour a day for every workday to provide care to a parent and
still be within the limits of the statute.193
If an employee is going to operate under a schedule where he or
she frequently, and perhaps unpredictably, misses work to care
for a family member, the employer will have to consider how it
can get the absent employee's work covered during those times.
Will the work have to be shifted to other workers, adversely af-
fecting their ability to do their jobs? Is it realistic to bring in a re-
placement worker to work only sporadically? If the absences are
affecting the company's productivity-and perhaps its profitabili-
ty-does the employer have the right to terminate a worker even
though he or she does not meet the standards of being a "key em-
ployee?"
An eligible employee's right to leave under the FMLA places a
much greater burden on the employer than the reasonable ac-
commodation requirements of Title VII 94 or the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 9 Under Title VII an employer is re-
quired to provide an accommodation to employees whose religious
beliefs conflict with company policies unless the accommodation
will cause the employer an undue hardship.'96 This has been in-
192. See id. at 68,086 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(a)-(e)).
193. See id.
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e(j) (2000).
195. See id. §12112(b)(5).
196. Id. § 2000e(j). Section 2000e(j) of Title 42 of the United States Code provides: "The
term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an em-
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terpreted to include conflicts that arise between the work sche-
dule followed by a company and the need of workers to take time
off for religious reasons.' 97 Because of Supreme Court precedent,
however, the reasonable accommodation requirement does not
place a large burden on employers. In Ansonia Board of Educa-
tion v. Philbrook, which related to conflict created by the em-
ployee's religious beliefs and the days he was expected to work,
the Court concluded that once the employer offers a reasonable
accommodation, it has met its duty under the law.198 This is true
even if a different accommodation offered by the employee would
also be reasonable. 199
In addition, the Supreme Court has set a low threshold for
what constitutes an undue hardship on the employer. In Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the employee needed a schedul-
ing change because of his religious practices.2 °° Hardison offered
several alternatives, each of which was rejected by the employ-
er.2" 1 The Court found that if an accommodation creates more
than a de minimis burden on the employer, it is free to reject the
option. °2
The ADA requires that an employer provide reasonable ac-
commodations to a disabled person who is otherwise qualified for
a job unless the accommodations would cause the employer an
undue hardship. 2 3 The ADA recognizes that among the types of
accommodations that an employer may have to offer is the possi-
bility of "part-time or modified work schedules."20 4
The courts have recognized that attendance is typically a ne-
cessary element of jobs.20 5 Under the terms of the statute, if a dis-
abled employee misses an excessive number of workdays, he or
ployee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practices without undue hard-
ship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id.
197. See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977); EEOC v. Univer-
sal Mfg. Corp., 914 F.2d 71, 74 (5th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081,
1085 (6th Cir. 1987).
198. 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986).
199. Id. at 68-69.
200. See 432 U.S. 63, 66-68 (1977).
201. Id. at 68-69.
202. See id. at 84.
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
204. Id. § 12111(9)(B).
205. E.g., Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1998).
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she will be considered unable to perform the essential functions of
the job and, therefore, not qualified for the position.2 °6
The FMLA does not provide the employer with the same type of
authority to terminate workers who are eligible for leave.207 This
is true even where their absence may cause an "undue hardship"
on the employer. 2°The "key employee" exception does afford
some level of protection to the employer. The Department of La-
bor regulations indicate that the "substantial and grievous eco-
nomic injury" test should be used to determine if a key employee's
employment restoration may be denied. 2 9 The regulations state
that this test is more stringent than the "undue hardship" test
under the ADA.210
Two criteria are used to determine whether an employee is a
"key employee." First, is the worker among the highest 10% of sa-
laried workers211 within seventy-five miles of his or her site of
employment? 212 Second, is the denial of reinstatement necessary
to "prevent substantial and grievous injury to the operations of
the employer?"213
Upon finding that the employee's restoration will create sub-
stantial and grievous injury, the employer must notify the em-
ployee that, based on this determination, the employer plans to
deny the employee reinstatement rights.214 The notice gives the
employee a chance to consider whether it is possible for other ar-
rangements to be made for the care of the family member.
In determining whether an employee's absence will cause sub-
stantial and grievous injury, the employer can consider whether
it is possible to get a temporary replacement for the employee.21 5
206. See, e.g., Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847, 850 (8th
Cir. 2002); Pickens v. Soo Line R.R., 264 F.3d 773, 777-78 (8th Cir. 2001).
207. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,934, 68,086 (Nov.
17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 825.220(a)(1)-(2)).
208. See id. at 68,110 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a)-(b)).
209. Id. at 68,094 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(a)).
210. Id. at 68,095 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(d)).
211. The new regulations did not change the definition of salaried employee. A salaried
employee is one "paid on a salary basis" as defined by the regulations adopted by the De-
partment of Labor in the regulations promulgated under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id.
at 68,094 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.217(b)).
212. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(2) (2000).
213. Id. § 2614(b)(1)(A).
214. Id. § 2614(b)(1)(B).
215. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. at 68,094 (to be codified at 29
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If it is determined that a permanent replacement must be hired,
the employer can consider whether it will cause substantial and
grievous economic injury if it restores the key employee.216 The
Department of Labor regulations further recognize that a precise
test on the level of injury that the employee's absence would
create cannot be articulated.217 If reinstatement would threaten
the "economic viability of the firm" or if the absence would cause
a "substantial, long-term economic injury," that would be suffi-
cient to justify refusal to reinstate.1 8 Minor inconveniences and
minor costs, however, would not constitute serious and grievous
economic injury.219
The substantial and grievous economic injury exception is im-
portant for employers. If an organization is going to be seriously
injured by an employee's absence, it needs the ability to proac-
tively plan for worker replacement. However, many employees do
not qualify as "key employees," and yet their absence may signifi-
cantly undermine both the operations of the business and its prof-
itability.
For example, suppose Kimberly is an outside sales representa-
tive assigned by her employer to a specific territory. Her compen-
sation is the commissions she earns on sales. Kimberly has ser-
viced the territory for a number of years and has effectively
developed relationships with her customers. When her mother
suffers a heart attack and needs bypass surgery in a distant city,
Kimberly is needed to care for her mother. Kimberly, therefore,
requests six weeks of leave.
Kimberly's absence from work may pose significant problems
for her employer. Who is going to cover Kimberly's territory dur-
ing her absence? Hiring a temporary replacement who is unfami-
liar with the company's product line and customers is not a rea-
listic solution. The employer has the option of temporarily
dividing the territory among other sales representatives who
serve adjacent geographic areas. However, they are strangers to
the customers in Kimberly's territory. The sales staff will also
continue to be responsible for servicing the customers in their
C.F.R § 825.218(b)).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 68,094-95 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(c)).
218. Id.
219. Id.
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own territories who are likely to be much more important to them
in terms of their future earnings. These situations may have an
adverse effect on sales. Additionally, if Kimberly's mother does
not recuperate quickly and Kimberly asks to extend her leave, the
employer's hardship is further complicated.
Despite the problems this absence may pose, the company has
little choice but to allow leave for the sales representative. The
heart attack and the bypass surgery requiring hospitalization
would satisfy the requirements of a serious health condition. If
the mother's healthcare provider certifies that Kimberly is
needed to care for her mother, the company must grant the leave
and allow Kimberly the same or an equivalent position upon re-
turn. Even if Kimberly ordinarily earns commissions that place
her in the top 10% of compensation out of all company workers,
the company cannot refuse to reinstate her at the end of the
leave. The "key employee" exemption does not apply since she
does not receive a salary.22°
There are many salaried employees who are critical to the op-
eration of a business but do not meet the salary requirements ne-
cessary for the employer to consider them "key employees." For
example, suppose Fred is a salaried maintenance supervisor and
possesses important responsibilities related to plant maintenance
and building project oversight. Fred's father suffers from Alzhei-
mer's disease and cannot stay alone for extended periods. Cur-
rently, his father is living with Fred's sister, who provides most of
the care and attention for the father. Fred's sister works part-
time for a local retailer. While most of her work hours are sche-
duled for weekends when Fred can care for the father, she is also
required to work one weekday. Fred and his sister have agreed
that on that day, Fred will take leave from work. The father's
health care provider is willing to certify that Fred is needed to
care for the father on that one day per week.
The same type of problem could be raised for employees who
are compensated on an hourly basis. Suppose Jim works in a
manufacturing plant and is charged with the final inspection of
products prior to customer shipment. Jim's mother suffers from a
chronic and serious health condition. The condition manifests it-
self in unpredictable episodes. When they occur, Jim must pro-
220. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(2) (2006).
20091 1351
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
vide her care. On any given workday, it is possible that Jim will
not be at work because his mother is in need of care. Because of
her condition, Jim missed fourteen days in the last four months,
six of which were in the current month. Other inspectors have
been required to work overtime because of Jim's absence. The ex-
tra hours have created stress and resentment and may have
caused one of the inspectors to miss several defects in goods
shipped to a now unhappy customer. As long as Jim is needed to
care for his mother's serious health condition, he is entitled to in-
termittent leave under the FMLA despite the impact on the other
workers.
X. RIGHTS OF EMPLOYERS DEALING WITH LEAVE REQUESTS
TO CARE FOR PARENTS
The FMLA makes it illegal for an employer to interfere with,
restrain, or deny an eligible employee's right to take leave to care
for a parent suffering from a serious health condition.22' While
the purpose of the statute is designed to protect workers' inter-
ests, Congress attempted to balance those interests with the in-
terests of the employer.2 2 The FMLA established a number of re-
quirements that the employee must meet to establish that the
leave falls within the confines of the statute.
A. Employer's Right to Notice and Certification
The onset of a serious health condition is not usually predicta-
ble. If an employee foresees the need to request leave based on
planned medical treatment for a parent, however, the employee
must provide the employer with thirty days' notice when possi-
ble.223 If the leave is not foreseeable, Department of Labor regula-
tions call for the employee to provide notice to the employer as
soon as practicable.224 This ordinarily is expected to be within the
time prescribed by the policies of the employer which cover such
leave.22
221. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2006).
222. Id. § 2601(b)(1)-(3).
223. Id. § 2612(e)(2)(B).
224. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,934, 68,099 (Nov. 17,
2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 825.303(a)).
225. Id.
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The law also requires that the employee "make a reasonable ef-
fort to schedule the treatment so as not to disrupt unduly the op-
erations of the employer."226 This would suggest that, when possi-
ble, the employee should take his parent for a medical
appointment related to a serious health condition at a time that
would not interfere with the employee's work schedule.
The law also allows the employer the right to demand certifica-
tion of the parent's serious health condition 227 and that the em-
ployee is needed to provide care for the parent.228 The statute pro-
vides that a certification from the health care provider will be
sufficient if it states: (1) "the date on which the serious health
condition began"; (2) "the probable duration of the condition"; (3)
the medical facts relating to the condition; (4) a statement that
the requesting employee is needed to care for the parent and the
length of time that this will likely require; and (5) if the employee
seeks intermittent leave or leave on a reduced schedule due to
medical treatments, the dates for the treatment and its duration
along with a statement that the employee's intermittent leave or
leave on a reduced schedule is necessary for the care of the par-
ent.229 It is also to include the expected duration and schedule of
the employee's intermittent or reduced schedule leave.230
Of course, there is the possibility that the employer may have
doubts about the validity of the certification. Is this truly a se-
rious health condition that has afflicted the parent? Or is the em-
ployee simply looking for time off and has found a doctor willing
to be lax in applying the guidelines of the certification? Recogniz-
ing the potential for abuse, as well as the possibility for legiti-
mate debate over the parent's condition, the FMLA allows an em-
ployer to require, at the employer's expense, the opinion of a
second health care provider designated or approved by the em-
ployer.231
In the event that there is a difference of opinion between the
first and second health care providers, the employer may require,
at the employer's expense, a third health care provider to supply
226. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(A).
227. Id. § 2613(a).
228. Id. § 2613(b)(4)(A).
229. Id. § 2613(b).
230. Id.
231. Id. § 2613(c).
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another opinion.232 At that point, the FMLA requires that the em-
ployer and employee must jointly approve the third provider.233
The opinion of this provider is final and binding on the parties.234
B. Employer Rights Regarding Leave on an Intermittent or
Reduced Schedule Basis
If the employee needs intermittent leave or leave on a reduced
schedule, the employer has the right temporarily to transfer the
employee "to an available alternative position for which the em-
ployee is qualified and which better accommodates recurring pe-
riods of leave than does the employee's regular position., 23
The transfer must be in compliance with federal and state law
and with any existing collective bargaining agreement.2 36 Addi-
tionally, the job can be altered so that it better accommodates the
scheduling needs of the employee.237 In this case, the position
does not have to involve equivalent duties, but must provide for
equivalent pay and benefits.238
The regulations also permit the employer the discretion to
"transfer the employee to a part-time job with the same hourly
rate of pay and benefits." 239 However, this right is limited in that
the employer cannot reduce the hours more than medical cir-
cumstances demand. 24 ° The employer's rights are further limited
in that even if the part-time position ordinarily would not require
benefits, the employer cannot eliminate benefits that existed
prior to the transfer.24' However, "an employer may proportio-
nately reduce benefits such as vacation leave where an employer's
normal practice is to base such benefits on the number of hours
worked."242
232. Id. § 2613(d)(1).
233. Id.
234. Id. § 2613(d)(2).
235. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,088 (Nov. 17, 2008)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.204(a)).
236. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.204(b)).
237. Id.
238. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.204(c)).
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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In addition, the employer cannot transfer an employee taking
intermittent leave or leave on a reduced schedule to a position
that would "discourage the employee from taking leave or other-
wise work a hardship on the employee."243 This would include
transferring a white-collar worker to a blue-collar job, reassigning
a day shift worker to the overnight shift, or forcing the employee
to work at another facility that is a significant distance from
where he or she currently works.2" Of course, when the need for
intermittent leave or leave on a reduced schedule ends, the em-
ployee must be returned to the position he or she held before the
leave, or to a position that is equivalent.245
XI. EMPLOYER'S DUTIES RELATING TO INTERMITTENT OR
REDUCED-SCHEDULED LEAVES
As discussed earlier, the employer is not always required to
reinstate an employee returning from FMLA leave to the same or
equivalent position if there are valid reasons for not doing So.246
One such reason might arise if the business goes through a reor-
ganization that has the effect of eliminating the position of an
employee on periodic leave.247 Another valid reason might exist if
the employer can establish that the prior performance of an em-
ployee on periodic leave did not meet the standard expected by
the employer.248
One question that has arisen concerns whether an employer
has a right to terminate an employee on reduced schedule or in-
termittent leave because the leave is creating an undue hardship
for the employer. Several courts have at least raised the possibili-
ty that an employer can terminate an employee where his or her
absence means that the person is no longer qualified for the posi-
243. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.204(d)).
244. Id.
245. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.204(e)).
246. For a further discussion of employer reinstatement requirements following em-
ployee return from FMLA leave, see supra notes 116 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 142-57 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Kohls v. Beverly Enters. Wis., Inc., 259 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 2001). In
Kohls, the employer refused to reinstate the employee after her maternity leave because
the employee failed to do an adequate job of checking account record keeping and the em-
ployer was dissatisfied with the way the employee ran the activities program for the resi-
dents of the employer's nursing home and rehabilitation facility. Id. at 801-03. The Kohls
court concluded that-based on these problems-the plaintiff would have been subject to
being discharged even if she was not on family leave. Id. at 805.
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tion.2 49 These cases have involved situations where the employee
is the one suffering from the serious health condition;25 however,
it would seem that an employer could raise the same argument
when it is a parent's serious health condition causing the em-
ployee to miss work.
In Spangler v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, the
employee was treated for depression for years, a fact known by
her employer.2 5 1 In a five-year period, Spangler missed over 110
days of work for medical or family reasons.252 The year before she
was terminated, Spangler was counseled on the need to reduce
her absences.253 She was also ordered to speak with someone ra-
ther than leave voicemail messages-her typical practice-when
she called to advise her employer that she would miss work.25 4
Months after the counseling, she missed several days consecutive-
ly, leaving a voicemail message each day.255 As a result, she was
placed on a six-month probation and warned that if she missed
more than two additional days during that period, she could be
terminated.256
Shortly after the probation ended, Spangler was placed back on
probation because of several additional unscheduled absences.25 7
Shortly thereafter, she missed three consecutive days of work.
The first day she called to advise the employer that her absence
was due to transportation problems, while the second day was
due to "depression again."25 9 On the third day, she did not call or
appear for work and was terminated.260 Spangler challenged the
termination under the ADA and the FMLA.26'
Spangler's employment involved daily phone calls to customer-
banks, providing customers with their daily cash needs, and per-
249. See infra notes 251-79.
250. See infra notes 251-79.
251. 278 F.3d 847, 848 (8th Cir. 2002).
252. Id. at 849.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id,
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 849-50.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 850.
261. Id. at 848.
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forming customer transactions in a timely manner."' On the
many days she was absent, other employees took over her respon-
sibilities, which interfered with their own jobs.263 In addition, one
of the customers assigned to Spangler had complained to her em-
ployer that her absences were interfering with the customer's
business.264
On her ADA claim, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment on behalf of the employer. 5
While the court did not specifically address the issue of whether
Spangler was disabled under the statute, it did find that her ab-
sences prevented her from performing her duties and that, as a
result, she was not qualified for the position.266 The court con-
cluded that the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA
did not require an employer to reassign the essential functions of
the job to accommodate her.267
The lower court also granted summary judgment to the em-
ployer on Spangler's FMLA claim.26' Although the lower court
found that Spangler created a material issue of fact regarding
whether she had a "serious health condition," it concluded that
there was no dispute that on the day she was terminated, she had
not given notice to her employer of the need for leave under the
FMLA.269
On the issue of adequacy of notice, the Court of Appeals disa-
greed and reversed the trial court's decision.27 ° The court con-
cluded that Spangler not "calling in" on the day she was termi-
nated did not prevent a reasonable jury from concluding that the
notice of the preceding day was sufficient to satisfy the FMLA's
notice requirement.271 In this instance, the employer was well
aware of Spangler's long history of depression and should have
recognized that a person suffering from depression may have
great trouble performing the otherwise routine behavior of notify-
262. Id. at 850.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 849.
265. Id. at 850.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 851.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See id. at 852-53.
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ing an employer of an intended absence.272 The court said that the
employer would be allowed to introduce evidence at trial showing
that the reason for the dismissal was not related to the FMLA.273
The appellate opinion contained interesting language relating
to employees who repeatedly miss work because of their own
health condition. The court stated in dicta that "the FMLA does
not provide an employee suffering from depression with a right to
'unscheduled and unpredictable, but cumulatively substantial ab-
sences' or a right to 'take unscheduled leave at a moment's notice
for the rest of her career.' 274
In Collins v. NTN-Bower Corp., to which the Spangler court re-
ferred, the employee had also missed work frequently due to de-
pression. 5 The Seventh Circuit pointed out that the evidence in-
dicated Collins suffered from a condition that would not improve
with time off.276 This meant that the plaintiff was asserting a
right to take unscheduled, intermittent leave because of her de-
pression for the rest of her career with her employer. 7 The court
ultimately resolved the case on the fact that Collins had not pro-
vided adequate notice to the employer of the reason she had
called in sick.27 In dicta, however, the court went on to say that
an employee's health condition that was not going to improve and
would cause her to continue to miss work "implies that she is not
qualified for a position where reliable attendance is a bona fide
requirement, and a person not protected by the ADA may be dis-
charged."279
The dicta in Spangler and Collins suggests that some courts
may be willing to set a limit on the length of time over which in-
termittent or reduced-schedule leave may be taken by the em-
ployee for his or her own serious health condition. By extension,
the same thinking could apply where the employee is taking leave
to care for the serious health condition of a parent.
272. See id. at 853.
273. Id.
274. Id. (quoting Collins v. NTN-Bower Corp., 272 F.3d 1006, 1007 (7th Cir. 2001)).
275. See 272 F.3d. at 1007.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1008-09.
279. Id. at 1007-08.
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XII. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF THE FMLA
To protect the rights of employees, the FMLA names a number
of prohibited acts to control the conduct of employers. Specifically,
an employer cannot "[I]nterfere with, restrain, or deny" an em-
ployee rights afforded under the statute.280 Nor can an employer
terminate or otherwise discriminate against an individual who
opposes an act that is unlawful under the statute.21 This would
cover not only the employee denied a right under the Act but also
any individual, including people who are not employees, who ob-
ject to a practice they believe to be in violation of the Act.282 The
FMLA also declares that it is unlawful to:
discharge or [otherwise] discriminate against any individual because
such individual-
(1) has filed any charge, or has instituted.., any proceeding under
[the FMLA],
(2) has given.., information... [regarding an] inquiry or proceed-
ing relating to any right provided under [the FMLA]; or
(3) has testified, or [plans] to testify, in any inquiry or proceeding re-
lating to any right provided [for] under [the FMLA] .283
Interference includes refusing to authorize an employee's leave
where he or she is entitled to it, discouraging an employee from
taking eligible leave, and manipulating an employee to avoid the
employer's responsibilities under the FMLA.284 Manipulation
could include transferring workers to keep a workplace below fif-
ty employees within a seventy-five mile radius so as to deny
workers' eligibility for leave; changing the essential functions of
the job; efforts by the employer to classify an employee as a "key
employee" who has less protection under the FMLA; and reducing
an employee's hours to render the employee ineligible for leave.285
In Williams v. Illinois Department of Corrections, the collective
bargaining agreement that covered Williams allowed up to a one-
year family responsibility leave.286 Williams informed his supervi-
280. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2000).
281. Id. § 2615(a)(2).
282. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,095-96 (Nov.
17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R § 825.220(a)).
283. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b).
284. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. at 68,095 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R § 825.220(b)).
285. Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b)(1)-(3)).
286. No. 05-cv-4227-JPG, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17119, at *3-4 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2007).
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sor of a need to leave work to care for his mother, who was suffer-
ing from kidney failure, obesity, high blood pressure, and di-
abetes.287 According to the mother's physician, she needed con-
stant care.2as
Williams's supervisor told him that he did not have enough
leave time to take leave and that his only option was to resign.289
Relying on the supervisor's appraisal, Williams resigned.29 ° How-
ever, the day after submitting his written resignation, Williams
requested the right to withdraw it and take leave under the
FMLA.291 He was told that it was too late because his paperwork
had been sent to the central office.292
In his suit, Williams contended that the employer violated the
law by "interfering with, restraining or denying the exercise of his
rights under the act, and on discharging him in retaliation for ex-
ercising his rights under the act."293 The employer responded by
contending that Williams was not denied any substantive rights
under the FMLA because Williams failed to follow proper proce-
dures in requesting leave, which under the binding collective bar-
gaining agreement required submitting a written request.294 The
employer also argued that Williams failed to give the employer
enough information to constitute notice that he might need leave
and that he did not provide thirty days notice as required by the
FMLA.295 In addition, in his letter of resignation, Williams did not
include any reference to his mother's health condition as the rea-
son behind his resignation.296
In denying the employer's motion for summary judgment, the
court felt that the plaintiffs conversation with his supervisor, al-
though not in conformance with the requirements of the bargain-
ing agreement, was sufficient to put the employer on notice that
the request might involve the FMLA.2 97 Williams told the super-
287. Id. at *4-5.
288. Id. at *4.
289. Id. at *5.
290. Id.
291. Id. at *5-6.
292. Id. at *6.
293. Id. at *6-7.
294. See id.
295. See id. at *13-14.
296. Id. at *13.
297. Id. at *15.
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visor that his mother was very ill and might need kidney dialy-
sis. 298 There should have been no question in the supervisor's
mind that dialysis qualified as a serious health condition and that
Williams was clearly inquiring about the need for leave to care for
his mother.299
The court found that the employer has a responsibility, once
the employee meets the threshold of providing information that
indicates the FMLA may provide him or her with some protec-
tion, to ascertain if the employee is requesting FMLA leave and to
obtain additional information if the employer doubts the serious-
ness of the health condition. °0 In this case, the employer's repre-
sentative did not carry out his responsibilities. Furthermore, he
provided Williams with false information about his FMLA rights
and omitted any reference to the possible availability of FMLA
leave." ' In denying summary judgment, the court concluded that,
based on the facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that Wil-
liams's rights were interfered with due to the false information
provided.0 2
In Liu v. Amway Corp., the plaintiff took maternity leave.30 3 As
the date that Liu indicated she would return to work neared, her
supervisor contacted her to tell her that she needed to return on
that scheduled date because of the backed-up work resulting from
her absence.30 4 The plaintiff then indicated to the supervisor that
she needed additional time because of physical problems from
pregnancy after-effects.3 5 Even though Liu was entitled to addi-
tional time, the employer immediately denied the request. 36 Ul-
timately, after Liu made another request for the additional leave
that was initially rejected, the supervisor relented and extended
the leave.30 7 However, the supervisor treated the additional leave
298. Id. at *17.
299. Id. at *17-18.
300. Id. at *11-12.
301. Id. at *18.
302. Id. at *20.
303. 347 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). In Liu, state law permitted the employee up
to four months of pregnancy disability leave. Id. at 1132. After that, she was entitled to an
additional twelve weeks under the FMLA. Id.
304. Id. at 1130.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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as "personal leave" rather than protected pregnancy leave. °8
When Liu subsequently asked for additional leave to bond with
her baby and to go to China to care for her terminally ill father,
the supervisor again initially refused to grant the request, but
then granted Liu a one-week extension. °9 When she returned
from China, her employment was terminated.31 °
In her suit under the FMLA and state law, Liu claimed that
the supervisor's conduct constituted interference with her
rights.311 However, the lower court granted summary judgment to
the employer on the interference claim.3 12 The lower court's deci-
sion was based on its conclusion that the FMLA only provided for
compensatory damages, and since Liu's employment was termi-
nated before she returned from leave, she had not suffered dam-
ages.313
The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding triable is-
sues of fact as to whether the supervisor interfered with the
plaintiffs rights, both by denying her right to extend leave to
which she was legally entitled and by pressuring her to return to
work before her rightful leave expired. 314 Also, by treating her re-
quest for additional time off as "personal leave," Liu's supervisor
was mischaracterizing it as not protected under the law and sub-
ject to refusal by the employer.1 5 If there were questions about
whether the FMLA protected the requested leave extensions, it
was the employer's duty to investigate.1 6 The court found that
the FMLA protects employees against having to "plead and nego-
tiate" with the employer to receive leave that is protected by the
statute.1 7
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1130-31.
310. Id. at 1131. Apparently, this was attributable both to a restructuring by the com-
pany and the fact that she had received the lowest performance evaluation of anyone in
her department. See id.
311. Id. at 1129. The plaintiff also included a number of other counts including one
that charged that the conduct of the company constituted sex discrimination and retalia-
tion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.
312. See id. at 1131.
313. Id. at 1133 n.6.
314. Id. at 1134.
315. Id. at 1135.
316. See id.
317. Id.
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In addition to interfering with an employee's FMLA rights, De-
partment of Labor regulations recognize that employers can vi-
olate the statute by discriminating against an employee or pros-
pective employee who has taken FMLA leave. 18 Such a violation
includes an employer's use of the fact that a person has taken
FMLA leave as a negative factor when the employer makes deci-
sions regarding hiring, promotions, or disciplinary action.31" Fur-
thermore, the employer cannot count FMLA leave as an absence
under the employer's "no-fault" attendance policy.
3 20
In examining retaliation and discrimination claims, most cir-
cuits have employed the burden-shifting framework for Title VII
cases set out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green.32 This framework requires that the plaintiff establish a
prima facie case by showing that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in con-
duct protected by the FMLA; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection be-
tween the two.
2
Once the employee meets that requirement, the employer must
show that there was some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the action. 2 3 If the defendant is able to provide a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the employee must show that the em-
ployer's stated reason is a pretext, and that the employer's real
reason was to retaliate for the plaintiff having taken FMLA
leave.324
In Liu v. Amway Corp., Liu alleged that her employer inter-
fered with her rights, and that the employer retaliated against
her for taking protected leave.3 25 However, the Ninth Circuit did
not use the burden-shifting standard of McDonnell Douglas when
considering Liu's claim.326 Instead, the court found that the law
318. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,095 (Nov. 17, 2008)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c)).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
322. Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 160-61 (1st Cir. 1998).
323. Id. at 160.
324. Id. at 161.
325. See 347 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003).
326. See id. at 1136. In Liu v. Amway, the court cited its earlier decision in Bachelder v.
American West Airlines, where it indicated that it would not follow the burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas. Id. (citing Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d
1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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protected employees from employer interference with the right to
take leave and from the employer's use of the leave as a basis for
termination. 27 In other words, the court was not willing to find
that either "discrimination" or "retaliation" were separate ways
for bringing an action against the employer."' The court cited Se-
venth Circuit precedent in which the Seventh Circuit held that
claims under the FMLA "do not depend on [proof of] discrimina-
tion" and do not require that the employee show that he was
treated less favorably than another employee was, but rather,
that his substantive legal rights were violated. 29
In Liu, the employer attempted to argue that the plaintiff was
dismissed as part of "a legitimate reduction in force."30 However,
the record indicated that she was selected for termination be-
cause of a negative performance evaluation that was adminis-
tered during her leave.33' The plaintiffs evidence showed that the
central factor in her evaluation was the subjective evaluation of
the supervisor. 3 ' This supervisor, who had earlier rejected re-
quests to extend her leave, mischaracterized her leave as person-
al leave and pressured her to return to work. 3 These facts gave
rise to the inference that the supervisor's evaluation was tainted
by his displeasure with the fact that Liu tried to exercise her le-
gal rights.334 As a result, the court reversed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment.3 3 5
In Sharpe v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., the plaintiff al-
leged retaliation for taking FMLA-protected leave. 3 6 The record
indicated that she took both periodic and intermittent leave for
her own medical reasons, to take care of her terminally ill moth-
er, and for a two-week period after her mother's death.337 There
was no dispute that the leave she took for her own medical issues
327. See id. at 1132-36.
328. See id. at 1136.
329. Id. (quoting Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712 (7th Cir. 1997)).
330. Id. at 1136 n.11.
331. See id. at 1136. The court in Liu noted that the plaintiffs score on the evaluation
had dropped 19% from an evaluation score assigned by a different supervisor only six
months prior. Id. at 1131, 1137.
332. Id. at 1136.
333. See id. at 1130, 1135.
334. See id. at 1137.
335. Id.
336. See 19 F. Supp. 2d 483,486, 488 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
337. See id. at 485-86.
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and the leave to take care of her terminally ill mother qualified
under the FMLA.338 The disputed issue was whether the leave she
took after her mother's death was protected because her doctor
gave her a "prescription" to take off time from work but did not
certify that the leave was covered by the FMLA.339
Upon returning to work after her mother's death, the plaintiff
found that her duties were reduced, all e-mails and files were re-
moved from her computer, and her processing software did not
operate.34 ° At her performance evaluation, Sharpe was told that
she needed to be more diligent in completing her work, that she
needed a doctor's note when she was absent for medical reasons,
and that she needed to disclose her whereabouts during the
workday.34' When she reminded the evaluators during the meet-
ing that she had an upcoming appointment with her surgeon, she
was told that "if she left the building during working hours she
would be fired."342 These events led Sharpe to resign.343
The court used the McDonnell Douglas standard to review
Sharpe's claim that she was retaliated against for taking FMLA
leave.3" The court rejected her claim that the leave taken after
her mother's death was protected since her physician had not cer-
tified that her condition met the criteria for FMLA leave.34 How-
ever, the court found that Sharpe had established a prima facie
case based on her initial FMLA absence.346 First, she established
that her earlier surgery, and perhaps her other medical problems,
were evidence of a serious health condition. She also established
that the leave to care for her mother was protected under the
FMLA.347 Sharpe also showed that upon her return to work after
her mother's death, she suffered an adverse employment action
and there existed a causal connection between the two.348
338. See id. at 488-89. The plaintiff in Sharpe had surgery that required her to miss
three weeks of work and had later absences attributable to chest pains and the onset of
costochondritis. Id. at 485-86.
339. Id. at 486, 489.
340. Id. at 486.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 488, 490.
345. See id. at 489.
346. See id. at 490.
347. See id. at 488-89.
348. See id. at 489-90.
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As the burden shifted to MCI to show that there was a legiti-
mate reason for its conduct, the company argued that its action
was tied to Sharpe's attendance problems.149 The court pointed
out that in using this argument about excessive leave, however,
the company had impermissibly included leave that she was en-
titled to take under the FMLA.3 ° The court found that while the
adverse actions MCI took may have been for legitimate reasons,
MCI failed to provide any evidence that offered a distinction in
the evaluation process between Sharpe's FMLA leave and those
days she missed that were not protected by the FMLA. 51 Conse-
quently, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to sum-
mary judgment on her FMLA claim. 52
In the event that an employer violates an employee's FMLA
rights, the FMLA permits the employee to sue for damages. For
example, if an employee was terminated in violation of the
FMLA, the law permits the employee to sue for lost wages or sal-
ary, as well as benefits and other compensation that was lost."' If
the employee did not lose compensation or benefits, as might be
the case where the employer refused to grant the leave and the
employee continued to work, the employee can recover monetary
losses up to twelve weeks of his or her wages or salary. 54 This
proscription would include a situation where an employee, impro-
perly denied a leave, incurred additional costs to have others pro-
vide care to his or her parent.
In addition, the FMLA provides for liquidated damages. The
amount owed is equal to the damages that were awarded due to
loss of salary, wages, and benefits. 5 If there was no loss of com-
pensation and benefits, the sum awarded to the employee in-
cludes the additional expenses that he incurred due to the denial
of the right to a leave. 6 An employer can defend a liquidated
damages claim by showing that its conduct was based on a rea-
349. Id. at 490.
350. See id. at 490-91.
351. Id. at 490.
352. Id. at 491.
353. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2006).
354. See id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II).
355. See id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii).
356. See id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II).
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sonable belief that the employer was not violating the employee's
rights.357
The FMLA also allows the court to provide appropriate equita-
ble relief to the plaintiff. This could include an individual being
hired where he or she was denied employment because of a record
of prior leave under the FMLA.358 It also allows the court to order
reinstatement for a plaintiff who was improperly terminated and
to award promotions to employees improperly denied the same. 59
A successful plaintiff is allowed to collect "a reasonable attorney's
fee, reasonable expert witness fees, and other costs."" °
XIII. THE PLACE OF THE FMLA IN DEALING WITH
ELDERCARE RESPONSIBILITIES
It is instructive that when the Department of Labor first pub-
lished proposed changes to FMLA regulations, and after they
were finalized, criticisms were voiced by both worker-interest
groups and employer representatives. Sharyn Tejani of the Na-
tional Partnership for Women and Families complained that the
changes adversely affected worker interests."6 1 Among the
changes that sparked dissent was one that allows employers to,
at least in some cases, have direct contact with the health care
provider of workers, their parents, spouses or children.362 While
357. See id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii).
358. See id. § 2617(a)(1)(B).
359. See id.
360. Id. § 2617(a)(3).
361. See Nora Lockwood Tooher, New Family Leave Rules Draw Mixed Reaction,
LAWYERS USA, Nov. 24, 2008.
362. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,102 (Nov. 17,
2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(a)) (providing that "[ilf an employee submits a
complete and sufficient certification signed by the health care provider, the employer may
not request additional information from the health care provider. However, the employer
may contact the health care provider for purposes of clarification and authentication of the
medical certification (whether initial certification or recertification) after the employer has
given the employee an opportunity to cure any deficiencies as set forth in § 825.305(c)....
For purposes of these regulations, 'authentication' means providing the health care pro-
vider with a copy of the certification and requesting verification that the information con-
tained on the certification form was completed and/or authorized by the health care pro-
vider who signed the document; no additional medical information may be requested.
'Clarification' means contacting the health care provider to understand the handwriting on
the medical certification or to understand the meaning of a response. Employers may not
ask health care providers for additional information beyond that required by the certifica-
tion form. The requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
('HIPAA') ... must be satisfied when individually-identifiable health information of an
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the purpose of this change may have been to help employers find
clarity in instances where the medical documentation supplied by
the employee did not resolve the question of whether the circums-
tances behind an employee's request justified FMLA leave, critics
argue that even though the employee's direct supervisor cannot
make the contact, 36 3 it still leads to the invasion of the privacy of
the employee or the employee's family member. 3' The change
which prevents an employee from taking paid leave (such as va-
cation time or accrued paid leave) concurrent with FMLA leave
where such a request would violate company policy regarding
when such leave can be taken is also troubling to those support-
ing the rights of employees.36 As Tajani pointed out, this change
may make it impossible for employees who cannot afford to take
unpaid leave to take FMLA leave even where circumstances
would otherwise permit it.
366
This criticism should not suggest that representatives of man-
agement are pleased with the new regulations. First, the new
regulations did little to clarify the perplexing problem that em-
ployers face in determining whether the health condition is a se-
rious one.367 Second, the new regulations failed to fully address
the issue of intermittent leave, which continues to be a major is-
sue that affects employers. 368 Employers had hoped that the new
employee is shared with an employer by a HIPAA-covered health care provider. If an em-
ployee chooses not to provide the employer with authorization allowing the employer to
clarify the certification with the health care provider, and does not otherwise clarify the
certification, the employer may deny the taking of FMLA leave if the certification is un-
clear. See § 825.305(d). It is the employee's responsibility to provide the employer with a
complete and sufficient certification and to clarify the certification if necessary.").
363. Id. (providing that contact with the employee's health care provider must be
through a health care provider, "a human resources professional, a leave administrator, or
a management official. Under no circumstances, however, may the employee's direct su-
pervisor contact the employee's health care provider.").
364. See Tooher, supra note 361.
365. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. at 68,089 (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a)). In pertinent part, this regulation provides: "An employee's abil-
ity to substitute accrued paid leave is determined by the terms and conditions of the em-
ployer's normal leave policy." Id.
366. See Tooher, supra note 361.
367. See id.
368. See id. The new regulations now require that the employee make a reasonable ef-
fort to schedule intermittent or reduced schedule leave so that it will not unduly disrupt
the operations of the employer. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. at
68,088 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.203). This is in contrast to the requirement under
the earlier regulations that an employee needing intermittent or reduced schedule leave
"must attempt" to schedule the leave so as not to unduly disrupt operations, 29 C.F.R. §
825.117 (2006).
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regulations would require employees to take intermittent leave in
longer increments.369 As Will Hannum, a partner with a firm in
Andover, Massachusetts, pointed out, "Employers wanted a way
to control intermittent level [leave] so that they are less at the
mercy of whatever [the employee's] circumstances are."37° The
new regulations, however, did not address that issue.37
There is a lesson in the criticisms leveled by both sides. The
FMLA sets the general parameters of the rights and responsibili-
ties of the employer and the worker. It does not and cannot pro-
vide ultimate solutions to the varied circumstances that arise
when a health condition affects the employee or his parent,
spouse or child.3 72 Even the same disease can affect people diffe-
rently. Some individuals survive ingesting a product contami-
nated with salmonella, while some people die. Some people suffer
a minimal interruption in their lives because of surgery, while
others, facing the same procedure, confront significant obstacles
in returning to normalcy.
The FMLA was forged in a spirit of trying to balance the inter-
ests of employers and their workers.373 It is a starting point. But
in many cases, the satisfactory resolution of a dilemma that aris-
es because an employee who must take time off to care for an el-
derly parent will be dependent on the motives of the parties and
their desires to seek a reasonable solution for the potential prob-
lems FMLA leave creates for both parties.
The employer may need to seek creative solutions that demon-
strate not only a desire to meet the letter of the law, but also its
spirit.7 4 Such an approach may serve to minimize the efficiency
and productivity costs associated with workers taking leave. 375 It
will also minimize costs associated with being forced to hire new
employees because a current employee, facing what he or she sees
369. See Tooher, supra note 361.
370. See id.
371. See supra note 368.
372. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,074 (Nov. 17,
2008 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.101).
373. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)-(3) (2006).
374. See Levin-Epstein, supra note 53, at A16-A17.
375. Id. at A17.
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as being a choice between caring for an elderly parent and keep-
ing a job, chooses the former.376
Many corporations view their careful adherence to the FMLA
as an appropriate and satisfactory way to meet their responsibili-
ties to their employees who have eldercare responsibilities that
occasionally call them away from their jobs.3 7' Their adherence
may, in part, be demonstrated by a survey commissioned by the
Department of Labor that found that more than 80% of employers
believe that compliance with the FMLA either had a positive or
non-negative effect on employee productivity and 87.6% believe
that compliance with the FMLA had no noticeable effect on com-
pany profitability.378 Perhaps consequently, most employers go
beyond the requirements of the law pertaining to employee leave.
In 2007, approximately "80% of working parents had some paid
leave" from their employers.379
A few companies have initiated innovative leave programs. For
example, Deloitte & Touche provides "paid parental leave and a
five-year sabbatical plan to extend time off for training and child
rearing."38 ° Because flexibility of work schedules is important to
eldercare providers, online scheduling that "allows employees to
request preferred work hours and swap shifts with colleagues" is
provided by JetBlue and J.C. Penney, which are among firms us-
ing electronic "kiosk" scheduling. 81
These programs may be harbingers of positive change; certain-
ly, they go beyond the FMLA's minimum requirements. The sup-
porters of the FMLA legislation should be credited with facilitat-
ing changes in the ways that employers think about caregiver
leave. However, it is increasingly evident that it is in the self-
interest of all parties to keep valuable workers aligned with em-
ployers who will accommodate their needs to assist in the elder-
382
care of their relatives.
376. See id.
377. See Kevin Sweeney, Studies Yield Conflicting Views on FMLA Success, EMP.
BENEFIT NEWS, Mar. 1, 2001; Vogel, Weir, Hunke & McCormick, Ltd., Surprise, Surprise!
FMLA Is a Hit, N.D. EMP. L. LETTER, May 2001.
378. See Sweeney, supra note 53, at 60.
379. Levin-Epstein, supra note 179, at A16.
380. Id. at A17.
381. Id. at A16.
382. See generally Smith, supra note 33 (discussing how employers can help workers
balance the competing demands between work and family responsibilities).
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XIV. CONCLUSION
The 1960s and 1970s marked a time when, due to social, eco-
nomic, political, and legal changes, there was a surge of women
entering the workforce.8 3 Many of these women were of child-
bearing years, and they came to their employers either having
children at home or likely to have them soon.3" Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act both addressed
the interests of women workers; both require employers to reform
employment practices to incorporate the needs of female em-
ployees." 5 In many instances, these changes led employers to
create childcare benefit programs, flex scheduling, and job shar-
ing to meet the needs of employees who were women and moth-
ers.
38 6
The addition of the FMLA bolsters the rights of parents,
whether they are mothers or fathers.8 Meeting the needs of par-
ents to schedule leaves of absence to care for sick children re-
mains a major issue for human resource departments.8 8
However, demographic shifts in the United States have created
new employment conditions.8 9 In the years ahead more FMLA
leave will be generated by employees so that they can provide
care to aging parents with failing health.39 ° Evidence of this trend
is provided by forecasters and surveys. 391 By 2020, 40% percent of
the workforce expects to care for an elderly relative."392 The Socie-
ty for Human Resource Management's 2003 Elder Care Survey
found that 47% of human resource professionals reported in-
383. See Edwardo Porter, Stretched to Limit, Women Stall March to Work, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2006, at Al.
384. See id.; Smith, supra note 33, at 352.
385. See Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act:
Gender-Neutral versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 459, 464
(2008); Christina M. Royer, Comment, Paradise Lost? State Employees' Rights in the Wake
of "New Federalism," 34 AKRON L. REV. 637, 682 (2001).
386. See Smith, supra note 33, at 352.
387. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2), (b)(4)-(5) (2006).
388. See Smith, supra note 33, at 352.
389. See id.
390. See id.
391. See id. at 352-53.
392. Id. at 353.
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creases in the number of employees dealing with eldercare issues
over the last several years.393
The Wall Street Journal reported in 2001 that, "almost two-
thirds of employees younger than age 60 believ[e] they 'have
elder-care responsibilities in the next 10 years.' 394 By an estimate
of the National Council on Aging, 30% to 40% of all employees
will assist their elderly parents in 2020, compared with 12% in
2006.395
Eldercare leave requests create challenges for employers that
are somewhat different than those faced when providing leave for
child care. 6 The leave time that an employee needs to care for
his or her child can ordinarily be expected to be episodic and of
short duration.397 Usually, the child recovers and the circums-
tances that caused the leave are rarely repeated.398 However,
when the care needs are of an aging parent, the expectations are
different. 99 Often, the health condition is serious, not likely to
improve, and, in fact, may worsen, necessitating an increase in
employee leave requests to care for the parent. °° The resulting
ever-more-frequent demands for leave create performance diffi-
culties for the employer and a physical and emotional burden for
the care-giving employee.40 '
Employers face increasing challenges to remain in compliance
with the FMLA as their employees demand unprecedented levels
of leave to be able to meet the growing pressures that they expe-
rience for family eldercare." 2 For moral and economic reasons,
employers are best served by establishing adaptive organizational
policies and practices that facilitate the optimal productivity of
employees whose work contributions may be compromised when
their eldercare responsibilities interfere with the expectations of
their employment.0 3
393. See Society for Human Resource Management, supra note 174.
394. Rose, supra note 26, at 61.
395. Id.
396. See Smith, supra note 33, at 353-54, 365-70.
397. See id. at 365.
398. See id.
399. See id. at 365-66.
400. See id. at 366.
401. See id. at 354.
402. See id. at 382-83.
403. See id. at 379-82.
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